A new form of American power
The US is leveraging control over advanced GPU exports as a new pillar of geopolitical power, prompting nations and companies to seek workarounds and indigenous alternatives.
Joel Miller

Days after Nvidia launched new hardware at the CES show in Las Vegas, the outgoing Biden administration announced further controls on advanced GPU sales worldwide. The policy extends beyond China to create three tiers of access, managing not just hardware but also the computing power needed to fine-tune advanced AI – a likely response to 2024’s breakthroughs in reasoning models like OpenAI’s o1 (and o3 demonstrated at the end of last year showing unprecedented capability in software engineering and mathematics).
The US has long wielded three tools of global influence: Military might secured trade routes and alliances, dollar dominance enabled financial hegemony, and market access shaped economic partnerships. Now compute power emerges as a potential fourth pillar… controlling next-generation Nvidia Blackwell chips could become as crucial as stationing F-35s in Japan or cutting nations off from dollar clearing.
Yet 2025’s landscape looks complex. Trump’s return will bring an increasingly ‘America First’ stance to compute allocation, viewing chip access as leverage in bilateral deals. Countries like India in tier 2 will look to form new alliances. Restricted nations are already adapting – China’s DeepSeek-V3 model released at Christmas, with GPT-4 performance levels trained on less than $10m of compute, shows impressive results with limited hardware, suggesting innovative routes around US controls are more than possible.
Nvidia has publicly opposed these broad restrictions and say they could harm US AI leadership. Other companies eye workarounds, from cloud services to open source strategies that make borders increasingly porous. Elon Musk’s Tesla, with a global footprint spanning all three tiers, faces difficult choices.
Takeaways: For businesses and society, the implications run deep. Access to advanced AI could increasingly depend on geography and politics rather than just technical capability. Firms may need to split operations across tiers or invest in efficiency over raw compute. Others might accelerate work on alternative architectures. As with the Cold War’s arms race, attempting to limit compute to certain nations could paradoxically speed up development of indigenous alternatives, leading to race conditions where nations pursue rapid, potentially unsafe AI development to maintain strategic parity.
